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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD

Address By Roscoe Pound
Dean of HarvardLaw School
At Dinner at The University Club, Denver, Colo., Wednesday, November 2, 1927
By Courtesy of C. P. Gehman, Shorthand Reporter

I

while I was listening to your presiWAS doing a little calculating
dent; and, if university presidents
and deans have been discharged here
into this community at the rate of
three a minute this afternoon, you can
see by a little figuring that there is
liable to be some sort of an avalanche
of learning.
But I was less alarmed at that rate
of discharge-which is the term you
use in your irrigation law out here,
isn't it?-when I reflected that some
of us at least, are not here in that
capacity. Dean Fulsom seemed to indicate that I was out here to collect
something that was due me. I confess
I did not know that I had come out
here on a bill collecting errand, but I
have been in Denver in times past on
that errand, and if there is anything
due I shall not go until I have collected
it, and shall carry it back with me!
One gets a bit used to post-prandial
introductory oratory, even when sometimes the speaker gets a bit Fulsome!
(Laughter)
I often think of a story
that I heard from a president of the
South Carolina Bar association some
years ago when I was a guest of that
association.
The president of the association told
us about his colored butler, who asked
for a night off to go to lodge. "Why,"
the master said, "Sam you don't need
to go to the lodge; they can run the
lodge without you." "No, they can't
run the lodge, Marse John; they can't
run the lodge without Sam," he said.
"How is that, Sam, are you the master?" "Oh, no, Marse John, I'se not
the master; I'se only the Supreme

High King, and there is seven officers
(Laughter)
above me!"
I thought I would try to speak to
you on the subject of law and laws,
and leading up to that subject I was
going to suggest to you that we are
in a time of transition, when It occurred to me that, when I was a student in the University of Nebraska,
from which I graduated in the year
1888-a good while ago-we then
thought that we were in a stage of
transition. I suppose in a sense everything is always in a state of transition.
But it is sometimes, perhaps, more in
a state of transition than at other
I suppose the truism that
times.
everything falls is emphatically true
of life.
The very essence of life is change;
and the social order that is today with
life is bound to reflect that change
which constitutes life, and the law,
which is a specialized form of social
control, cannot but itself be continually to a greater or less extent in a
condition of change.
But I suppose we have today in the
law as everwhere else to mediate between the need of stability and the
need of change, and the economic order in which your civilization has culminated calls for stability, which presupposes general security. But it has
to do with life; it is an order of life;
it has to do with conduct, and every
item of conduct in a sense is unique.
And so we have always with us a
problem, as you might say, of mediating between a need of stability and a
need of change.
But at some times the balance in-
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clines toward change and at other
times toward stability. In the last
century it inclined very much toward
stability. At least we think so as we
look back at the last century. We did
not think so then. I remember there
used to be a college oration that went
through oratorical contests year by
year. Its title changed; its content
changed somewhat, but its main theme
was Progress. We did not talk so
much about transition then; we called
it progress.
And I remember that college oration
used to begin with Adam's fall, and it
traced progress down to Appomattox.
I suppose if the situation had been
located south of Mason and Dixon's
line a different terminus might have
been selected. But progress in the
year of our Lord 1888 for the latitude
and longitude of Nebraska had temporarily stopped at Appomattox; and
as I look back at that I think it was a
bit symbolical, because while we believe in progress, I suspect we had an
idea that from then on progress was
going to take the form of perfecting a
few details, the great outlines had
been pretty well worked out, and progress was going to consist in touching
up a detail here and touching up a
detail there.
As we look back now we can say
that the balance was on the side of
stability. Quite as definitely I think
one cannot but feel today it is inclined to the side of change.
I had occasion not so long ago to
look over note books that I kept as a
first year's student of law under some
very great teachers, and they were
very confident, and had just cause, I
suppose, to be confident that they had
got hold of the great fundamental,
eternal principles, and that those who
came after them would be merely
working those principles out in detail.
It is rather alarming to see what
has become of some of those princi-
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ples. You cannot be as sure of them
now as you could be thirty odd years
ago. In the course of a generation
many of them have simply disappeared from the legal map. Instead of
working out of details in the principles which now seem to be vital in
the law, which were hardly dreamed
of at that time, and yet we can look
back and, with a little logical acrobatics such as a teacher always has to
indulge in, we can demonstrate them
by authorities going clear back to the
Year Books.
Well, I am certainly safe -in saying
that we are in a time of transition,
and I suspect that transition plays a
very much larger part in the law, is
much more of a factor in the law today, than it was in the law a generation ago.
Now of the phenomena of this time
of transition, one that seems to me
peculiarly significant-if you would
like, impressive -is
that, with the
greatest respect for law, preaching respect for law up and down the line,
we are not so sure about laws.
A generation ago we believed that
law was an aggregate of laws, and yet
with all the praise that we have continually upon our lips for law, you find
relatively little praise for laws.
I was going to quote from a cowboy
version of Shakespeare that used to
be current when I was a student,
where Mark Antony, standing over the
body of Caesar is reported to have
said, "But, after all, boys, we do not
come here to praise Caesar, but to
bury the son-of-a-gun!"
I suppose there is no other country
in the world where there is such an
output of laws and such complaint of
laws when put forth as there is with
US.
We devote more energy to our lawmaking machinery, it is more continuously in action, there is more of it,
it is more complicated than I suppose
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any lawmaking machinery in the
world or that the world has ever seen,
and along with that machinery and
that output I suppose there is more
outcry about the laws when enacted
than there is anywhere in the world
or ever has been.
Now of course in a way that is relative if you take the great compilation
of the Emperor Justinian. There are
four parts. Two parts codify the traditional law, the jurist made law; and
two parts codify legislation. The legislation in the Code and the Novels
cannot run back more than two and
one-half centuries, and mostly runs
back two centuries, before Justinian's
time. The juristic part represents the
activities of Roman jurists for four
centuries. But, that half of that compilation represents a legislative activity of two centuries, suggests to us
that, after all, when we come to codify
our law, it will be some time before
half of that part of our law which we
conceive to be significant and worthy
of perpetuating will be legislative in
origin.
As to a good deal of our legislation
you can say about it what the freshman said about his hero in his theme,
when he said that he made himself
immortal for a great many years!
(Laughter) And yet it will not do for
us to sneer at legislation as we are
accustomed to do. It is said, and said
truly, that the conspicuous fact in the
American state is the energy of the
legislature; and if we look back at our
legal history we are bound to admit
that legislation has played no small
part in making our American law
what it is.
Let us go back to our formative era.
Think of the statutes that have entered into the very corpus of our
American law. We have almost forgotten that these things are statutory,
the statutes are so universal, they
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have been so generally adopted, and
have stood the test of time so well.
Take the way in which we made
over the law of real property in this
country in the Nineteenth century. A
great deal that we have thought of as
common law in this country was really legislation, beginning in New York
in 1795. Our whole law of descent
and distribution has been made over
in statutes that are substantially alike
all over the country. Our whole system of conveyancing is statutory. Our
homestead and exemption laws, almost universal-covering a great part
of the country at least-are statutory.
One can go on with a long list of
statutes; and a member of your bar
has pointed out as a result of very
valuable research how many of these
things go back to the time and how
much of them we owe to the genius of
They are great
Thomas Jefferson.
legislative achievements that are a
part of our everyday law; and it is
not to be said that modern legislation
does not play an important part in
our everyday administration of justice.
Why, at every turn the lawyer encounters statutes. There is not an
item of law that potentially may not
be and that actually is not affected by
legislative lawmaking. And yet, with
all that, our tendency is to ignore legislation or to treat it certainly very
lightly.
Take our legal education-it almost
ignores the existence of legislation. I
suppose there is not a law school in
the country of any pretensions that
has a course in statutory interpretation, a fairly important practical subject. Our legal schools ignore legislation. A few years ago we had a debate that was running up and down
the law schools of the land with reference to the nature of the res of a
beneficiary of a trust-were his rights
in rem or were they in personam?
And I remember on one occasion
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discussing this subject with a very
great law teacher, who has since attained one of the highest positions
upon the bench. I said to him, "Why,
take the case of a person who has an
unrecorded deed of conveyance to a
piece of land; he has legal title, but if
some one gets another conveyance
from the grantor and records it, taking for value without notice, he can
cut off those rights in rem of the owner by the- unrecorded conveyance."
"Oh, well," he said, "that is statutory."
Is our universal American institution of recording acts something to be
ignored in an analysis of an everyday legal situation?
Of course that viewpoint grows out
of our historical modes of thought in
the last century. The historical jurist
had no use for legislation. It did not
enter into his scheme of things. A
statute to him seemed to be a sort of
pathological growth in the law, that
we could leave out of account in our
consideration of its normal phenomena.
But take the writers of our text
books. Did it ever occur to you what
a contrast there is between the way
In which a practical text writer, writing a practical treatise for practical
men to use in their every day practical work, will deal with judicial decisions, and the way in which that
same text writer will deal with statutes?
Why, he would consider himself disgraced if there were a judicial decision in an English speaking country
from the seventeenth century to the
date on the title page of the book that
did not find a place somewhere in his
foot notes. But as to the statutes, the
practitioner must look them up for
himself as best he can-they do not
come within the purview of the work
of a legal scholar.
I always think of a vigorous old time
Federal judge, of the type that was

more common in this part of the world
when I came out here than It is now,
as he was delivering himself very vigorously from the bench one day an
oral opinion in which he was laying
down the law applicable to the case
with great force, occasionally by way
of a punctuation mark bringing down
his fist upon the bench.
As he proceeded with his forcible
exposition a member of the bar seeing
that things were not going the way he
conceived they ought to go, pulled
down a volume of the statutes and
opened the volume at a certain page
and handed it to an usher to take up
to the bench. The usher took it up
and laid it on the bench, but the judge
went on with his vigorous exposition
of the law, and then having reached
the end of a paragraph he picked up
this book and looked at it a momentthen looked at it again-looked at it
more carefully, then shut up the book
and put it down and went on, "But
they tell us there is a statute to the
contrary. Now what is a statute?
Words-mere words!
Judgment for
the plaintiff!"
(Laughter)
Well, I am afraid that has been the
attitude of the teachers of the law in
law schools, and of text writers; and
I do not know that it is any wonder
that legislation is not entirely a thing
for us to be proud of, when we insist
on dealing with it in that fashion.
As I have said, there is really nothing in the history of our law-not in
the history of our American law-to
lead us toward that attitude. Even in
the law of today, one of the great
achievements has been, has it not?
workmen's compensation - absolutely
a work of legislation, in which the law
making branches achieved the solution of something with which the
courts had been wrestling for a generation, with results that perhaps have
not entirely added to the respect for
judicial justice.
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And yet there we have that situation. My impression is that our difficulties are not with legislation in and
of itself, much as we declaim against
the quantity of legislation. What we
really have to address our minds to
is quality of legislation; and that
quality I suspect is intermedially connected with the phenomena of a time
of transition.
Now it has been proposed that we
have a legislative holiday in some
states. Propositions have been made
to call special sessions of legislatures
for the purpose of repeal only, enacting nothing. Well, it would be an interesting thing if we could have the
short and simple statute books of a
hundred years ago. The statute book
in Michigan, and the statute book in
Ohio, have now, I believe, got to four
volumes.
The statute book in New
York occupies a shelf that is longer
than that balcony up there!
But we cannot as things are today
expect to go back to the old-time one
volume statute book. The points of
contact of man and man in the society
of today are too many. The things
that call for solution and call for solution immediately are too many. We
cannot wait. In a time when communication by airmail between Boston and Los Angeles is two days, we
cannot take the time to deal with
these questions that come up as we
did at a time when it took General
Grant going as a cadet from Ohio to
West Point nine days to make that
journey.
The mere circumstances of our* life
compel us to deal with things speedily, where a generation ago we waited
a slow process of judicial inclusion
and exclusion.
So I imagine that the statute book
is something that we have got to expect to have with us. In fact Montesquieu saw this long ago, when he
pointed out that an agricultural com-
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munity needed few laws and a commercial
community needed many.
That is even more true of an industrial community such as that in which
we live.
Our problem, I suspect, then, is not
one of quantity; it is one of quality.
There are some other things besides
quality to be taken into account. Did
you ever consider the difference between the sedulous way in which our
governments take care that the decisions of the courts be made accessible and the free and easy way in
which legislation is promulgated?
Take our Federal statute book, for
a generation after the revised statutes
of the early seventies, it became less
and less possible to say with assurance what Federal legislation was.
And what has congress thoughtfully
done for us recently? We now have
a private compilation, which by legislative enactment is prima facie evidence in our courts of the legislation
of the Federal government-prima
facie, but any of us are at liberty to
show that there is legislation that is
not there, or there is legislation there
that ought not to be.
I do not believe you will find a
parallel to that, situation since the
time of the ruler of antiquity who
carved his laws high up on a column,
out of sight, to enjoy the embarrassment of his subjects who were bound
by them but did not know what they
were!
What are the reasons for this attitude toward legislation? I think there
are three. It is to be accounted for
partly through a bit of history, a professional tradition. It is to be accounted for partly because our law
schools have always been professional
law schools and have echoed that professional tradition. But partly also it
is something connected neither with
the teaching of law nor with the practice of law, but very closely and in-
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timately related to an old time American pioneer characteristic. Let us
look for a moment at each of these
things.
I said to you a moment ago that our
legal scholarship in the last generation was historical. Now the historical scholar in the science of law in
the last century did not have any intimate connection with history.
It always makes me think of a Greek
candy maker who attained some political importance in my native town
when I was a bit interested in politics,
and as Greeks came to town and became eligible for political activity he
always saw to it that they were taken
around and registered as republicans.
Mot of them had come to this country because their views in Greece
were republican, and Greece was a
monarchy; and he always explained to
them, republic and republicans, it is
the same thing! (Laughter)
Now the historical scholar and history were not the same thing. But the
historical jurist of the last century
conceived the law was something that
could not be made. It was something
that grew spontaneously, like language, as an idea of right or an idea
of justice released itself in the development of legal institutions, legal
proceedings, legal doctrines, and all
he could do was, as it were, to sit
upon the fence and observe, and could
no more by any conscious effort affect
the orbit of this development thanshall I say?-he could affect the
phases of the moon or the revolutions
of the planets.
That was a cheerful doctrine for the
era of mid-Victorian liberalism, when
at least in the part of the world where
I observed it, certain things had come
to a grand finale at Appomattox; but
it is a doctrine that has not been able
to hold its own in legal science in the
last 35 years.
More and more we become conscious
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that there are things that call for
effort, that we can do things and must
do things, and that this historical
dogma that preaches futility is simply
preaching a juristic optimism that Is
out of line with modern life.
But that is the way we were taught;
a statute is an attempt to do the impossible, it is a pathology, as I said,
an abnormal growth in the law. Now
we have got to make the best of it;
we have got to construe it, if it is in
derogation of the common law, strictly; we have got to fit it into our common law scheme, and one way or another we cannot regard it simply as a
futile effort to do something that cannot be done.
But along with that there was another factor, as I suspect, that operated even more vigorously in this country. As I said, our American law
teaching has always been professional.
It goes back to the very beginning of
the law teaching in English speaking
countries. The Inns of court had their
very origin in bodies of law students,
apprentices studying under the master.
It was an apprentice teaching that
brought apprentice teaching to this
country. The first law school in this
country, Judge Reeves' school, at
Litchfield, Connecticut, was nothing
but a glorified law office, and we havE
gradually brought those glorified la
offices under the eaves of universities;
but they have kept that tradition to
the present time.
Now in civil law countries that is
very different. The civil law has been
a body of written texts since at least
the fifth century when the writings of
the great Roman jurisconsults were
given legislative authority. The makers of the civil law have been teachers; their great books have been commentaries on written texts. And the
civilian Is always at his best when he
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is interpreting or applying or formulating a written text.
It has been very different with us.
The fundamental ideas of our law had
become pretty well fixed before we
had much if any legislation on legal
subjects in English speaking countries.
Ours is a tradition not of handling of
written texts but of finding the
grounds of decision in reported judicial experience.
The common law lawyer is usually
at his worst when he is called on to
apply or to formulate a written text;
and the law schools have simply reflected that attitude of the profession
that the real law is the traditional law,
that the life of the law is in the tradition and not in the written formulated
text.
But I think there is still another
reason, and that is our pioneer faith
in versatility. The pioneer had to be
versatile; he was versatile; he had to
be equal to all the emergencies of life.
If he could not do himself what had to
be done it had to be undone. He must
himself prove equal to every emergency that presented itself or he must
get off the earth or go back east where
he came from. It was not possible for
him to turn to a well-organized board
of health or board of house commissioners around the corner; he could
not write a letter to the department
of agriculture. He did not have even
the ordinary every day experts that
we regard as essential to our household emergencies sometimes within
miles. If a doctor was accessible it
was only, usually, after a long drive
to bring him to the place where he
was needed. It was necessary for the
pioneer to be versatile; he was versatile, and he conceived a sort of contempt for the specialist. I like to read
in Cooper's Pioneer about the way in
which the physician got his start in
the community. He would serve an
apprenticeship under the physician in
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a community, and does not seem to
have picked up very much in the ap,
prenticeship. A man got a bullet in
his hand and a physician used a jackknife to extract it; and by observation of how Indians and others dressed wounds, etc., he got his start in the
practice of the medical profession.
Well, that is the way things were
done and could be done in a pioneer
community. Experts did not seem to
be particularly necessary. The pioneer
conceived that any honest citizen, by
and large, was equal to anything that
had to be done in the community. He
learned to administer by administering. He observed, and he applied his
good sense to what little experience
there was and gradually picked up a
few simple problems.
Let us remember that it was a long
time before we thought it was necessary for a man to be a lawyer in order
to sit upon the highest courts In many
of our states. In New York the senate had ultimate appellate jurisdiction
until 1847. The decrees of Kent and
of Walworth were reversed, and you
can read the opinions of the senators
as they voted to reverse them. It is
interesting to notice that somehow or
other Johnson's Chancery ranks a little higher as an authority than Wendell's reports, in which Kent's and
Walworth's decrees were reversed.
It was not until 1847 in New York
that those who ultimately passed upon
writs of error and appeals were necessarily learned in the law. It was not
until 1857 in Rhode Island that the legislature gave up the last of its appellate jurisdiction. It was not unil
1874 in Pennsylvania that the legislature gave up its jurisdiction in divorce.
It was a long time before we conceived that any special preparation or
expertness was necessary for adjudication. Now I suggest to you that in
legislation we are in that stage still.
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We have learned in administration
that it is necessary at least to have
an expert in the background. If a
commission is composed of persons
who have no expert knowledge, there
Is a corps of experts behind the
scenes. We learned a long time ago
in adjudication the necessity of putting upon the bench men learned in
the law.
We have still to learn, and we have
got to learn pretty soon, if this outcry
about legislation means anything, that
behind this work of lawmaking there
must be expert processes and expert
prepar+* -- ' of which our ideals of
pioneer versatility took no account.
How is it that we do actually prepare, make smooth the paths, for legislative lawmaking?
Well, -of course
there are certain official agencies.
There are the judiciary committees
of the houses-I am speaking only of
legal matters, because that is all that
I am competent to talk about-there
are legislative reference bureaus;
there are arising over the country
judiciary councils.
Now those are
great institutions.
I expect to see
them do great things.
But their scope is relatively narrow.
There are certain unofficial agenciesthere are bar associations, state and
national. There is the American Law
Institute, the American Judicature Society, the Commercial Law League,
the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
The bar associaions have done a
great deal. The Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have given us
laws on commercial subjects some of
which seem to me to be models of
what legislative lawmaking should be.
The bar associations within certain
limits have done and are doing a great
deal. Take such matters as procedure, where lawyers are especially
competent, where they have a particular knowledge of the difficulties of
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the problems and of the materials with
which the solution is to be reached,
there they have done much. Consider
such things as the corporation law in
Ohio, under the auspices of the Ohio
State Bar association; the new rules
of court in Delaware, under the auspices of the Delaware Bar association; the things done by the American Judicature Society for judicial organization and administration; the
work done by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws-all these are
admirable.
But beside that there are certain
agencies with a less breadth of view,
a less grasp upon the problems, that
I suspect are in practice much more
effective. For every trade, every business, every profession, every sort of
organized activity, today has its national association, has its legislative
committee, has its annual or biennial
budget of bills, which it persistently
urges, and in the end is likely to be
able to put upon the statute book.
Now when the lawyer deals with
these purely legal problems he has one
great advantage. He is likely to have
in bar associations men who represent
every type of client in the community,
who know how a particular law will
affect their particular clients, who
will be watchful to see to it that nothing is put in there which will be prejudical to the interests with which he
is immediately concerned.
But I do not think that is as much
so as it used to be. We are getting
so specialized that the very necessities of our economical organization
are such that more and more we do
not have the type of lawyer we had a
hundred years ago, or in this part of
the world a generation ago, the roll
of whose clients was a cross section
of the community.
But by and large it is true that a
cross section of a bar association will
pretty nearly give you a cross section
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of the interests in a locality. And today the moment you get outside of
those associations you find a radically
different type of preparation for legislation. Let me give you an example.
All of you know, of course, the problem of interpleader, but let me put a
typical case. John Doe we will say is
a bachelor with some money, and he
rooms and boards in a boarding house
that is kept by Richard Roe and Mary
his wife. He runs up quite a bill
there. Richard and Mary disagree;
each claims to be operating the boarding house; each claims that John
shQuld pay him or her as the case
may be. Now if John is wealthy and
Mary good looking and Richard indigent, the chances are that two juries
in two separate actions, duly moved
by a benevolent desire more equitably
to distribute the economic surplus, will
find in each case for the plaintiff. Of
course the remedy is in equity in a
suit for interpleader. But that bill of
interpleader is hedged about with
many historical difficulties. There are
purely historical anomalies, one might
say, that beset that proceeding, historical limitations upon its scope.
Well, Congress undertook at the
last session to deal with that matter,
so far as the Federal courts are concerned, and it has given us a new
statute, which extends the scope of
Interpleader, and removes those historical obstacles in the case of insurance companies, surety companies and
fraternal
insurance
organizations.
Other courts are exactly where they
were before.
Well that is not all. Take another
subject that has made the law infinite
trouble, and that is the subject of
contributory negligence.
There are
no less than six different solutions of
contributory negligence In the books.
We have experimented in this country
one state or another with three or four
of them. The civil law has an entirely

different way of dealing with the matter, and the Roman jurists apparently
never could agree between two or
three distinct views.
Congress dealt with that matter
some time ago, and fifteen states have
dealt with it by legislation, and have
brought in a new doctrine for employes of railroad companies, or, In
Nevada, for employes in mines.
Now the solutions that have been
propounded judicially were applied
equally to the various problems. The
farmer with a lumber wagon or the
railroad company operating a freight
train were subject to the same rule.
But now we have this improved legislation the benefit of which accrues
simply to employes of railroad companies, or in Nevada, to employes of
mines. Now it is possible there is
something peculiar about that type of
employe, but I suspect the peculiarity
is that it is represented, or was represented before the lawmaking bodies,
by a vigorous organization.
But how those things affect
is really an interesting study,
it is something more than to
law for one type of litigant
other for another type.

the law
because
get one
and an-

Take a case that has been coming
up over and over again, ever since the
bankruptcy law of 1898. The Committee on Commercial Law of the American Bar Association is now engaged,
and it has been engaged off and on
for a long time on improvements in
the bankruptcy law. And what is one
of the things that trouble them? The
commercial lawyer is very apt in
thinking about a bankruptcy law to
have in his mind's eye the interests of
the general creditors.
Now equity
had certain doctrines about cases
where it conceived that it should impose a constructive trust or there
should be a lien, and the tendency in
this legislation, promoted by those
who had before their eyes the inter-
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ests of the general creditor, is to do
away with these equity doctrines and
bring everybody in on the basis of the
general creditors. But some how or
other the courts have always managed to read the doctrines of equity
back into the statute when they have
been legislated out.
Now it is easy to see why the courts
are conscious that there are two sides
to this situation. They are conscious
that this legislation is framed from one
standpoint only, and it is a most unfortunate situation, but a very real
situation, in our law, that you have
legislation drawn continually from the
standpoint of one interest, compelling
the courts by a process of interpretation or application or what you like
to bring into account the other interests, which ought to have been taken into account in the formulation of
the written text.
Now one could vouch any number of
cases of this sort; but I am always
afraid that I may hit upon something
that is locally controversial. I do not
know just what sort of statute you
have in this state. I did not have
time before I came on here to look at
your statutes. But I do not imagine
you are one of the states, of which
there are a few, that has a type of
material liens statute whereby one can
furnish material to a cost of five times
the amount of the contract between
the owner and the contractor and the
owner can find himself liable to pay
not the amount of his contract but
the amount that the material man
charged the contractor.
When you look into the history of
that legislation as I have looked into
it in a number of states, you find behind it the activities of a lumber dealers association.
Well, what are we going to do about
a situation of that kind? We have
got a situation where the professionals are not acting, the experts are not
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acting. You cannot blame the layman
for bringing to bear the power of his
organization to get something done.
In many of these situations it is necessary that something be done. It is a
situation that occurs in every walk of
life, over and over again.
It has happened that professions
have forgotten that they are practical
institutions, that they exist for practical purposes. Over and over again
charlatans and quacks have had to
teach the medical profession, have
had to wake it from a pedantic slumber. Over and over again volunteers
have had to remind the military profession that they are a practical profession.
I like to tell the story about the Hessians at the battle of Bennington,
highly trained, highly disciplined professional soldiers, sent on a forced
march to rescue their comrades, arrived on the field too late because, as
the commanding officer explained, on
account of the mud and the bad state
of the roads, it was necessary to halt
five times in a mile to dress ranks!
Then there was the naval commander of whom Captain Mahan tells in
his Great Naval Battles of the Eighteenth Century, who had his orders to
keep a certain number of cable lengths
behind the ship next ahead of him in
the order of battle, and he stood upon
the quarter deck so intent upon keeping his precise place in the line that
in the smoke and excitement of battle
he drove through the French line without firing a shot!
And we have to remember that in
the Civil war our professional naval
officers did not believe in the Monitor;
that it took lay pressure, lay ingenuity, lay creative energy, to really make
an efficient fighting machine out of
the navy.
Now some times we have to learn
these same things in our own profession, and we cannot wonder that the
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layman takes hold and does things
when for the reasons I have spoken of
or other reasons we are not doing
what we ought to be doing, we are
not organizing the creative energies
of our profession, we are leaving these
things to be done by some one else.
Well, what is it that we ought to
do? In a civil law country they would
say of course, "Set up a ministry of
Justice; clear away limiting jurisdictions." That has been urged in EngBentham
lish speaking countries.
urged it in England about 1830. Lord
Haldane urged it in the rather remarkable report which he presented to the
Judge
British Government in 1918.
Cardozo urged it in the report of the
commission of which he was a member in New York. But I am afraid
we shall not see Ministers of Justice
in our time in any English Speaking
jurisdiction. It is rather alien to the
genius of our institutions. We expect
these things to be done unofficially;
we are suspicious of official institutions of this kind, if for no other reason because we feel they are likely to
get into politics, and we are likely to
get the same sort of preparation that
we get at the present.
Well, if we cannot have ministers
of justice, is there anything in any
institution that we have got available
that we can turn in whole or in part
to that purpose? There are several
unofficial institutions springing up,
and there is one old existing, well
established institution in this country
that I should like to see put its shoulder to the wheel and try to do its
share, and that is the Law School.
I cannot but feel that we have been
negligent in allowing the situation to
grow up in America. While we have
been studying the Year Books and collecting large and expensive accumulations of Black Letter folios, I am
afraid we have let a very important
part of our duty get by us unnoticed.
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I make this observation because In
our universities we have the possibilities for something very like a ministry of justice. There are the trained
men; there are the scientific conditions of study; there is the secure
tenure, and there is the opportunity
of dealing with questions as a whole
and not in local fragments; there are
the opportunities for dealing with
questions without restrictions of jurisdiction or parties or venue.
And there you can bring together
more comprehensive faculties. Take
such subjects as promoters' liability,
or sales agencies, that are making a
great deal of trouble in some parts of
the country today. If those are to be
dealt with properly you will have to
bring something more than lawyers
into the field-economists, specialists
in those lines; perhaps specialists
from schools of business will have to
be brought into the work, and they are
there in the faculty of any great university.
So I say we have in our universities
right at hand the materials out of
which to make institutes for research
in preparation for a better and more
effective legislation.
Now I can conceive that a law
school has not done its whole duty
when it has turned out well trained
men to enter into the practice of their
profession.
If that is all that it is to do why
should a university maintain a law
school under its roof? Lawyers have
a work to do in bar associations and
in legislatures and as citizens in urging and promoting and explaining
measures that will make our administration of justice in the next generation as effective as it was in the last.
But I do not believe that law schools
will have done their full duty when
they have turned out men trained and
disposed to take up that work.
Just as our university is doing the
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work of research that has opened up
modern technical manufacture in almost every field of industry today,
why shouldn't they do the work of
research that shall be behind the making of our laws a more effective instrument.
I look forward to the time, and I
hope it will come speedily, when the
law school will feel that its duty is
not only to train practitioners, not
only to train men who will do their
work in bar associations and in legislatures and as advocates of proper
measures before the public that must
necessarily rely upon them, but I look
forward to the time when in law
schools up and down the land will be
doing this work of preparation that
must go before effective law making.
Think of the advantage that we
have. The country is so unified today
that these questions must be looked
at largely as nation-wide questions.
And yet we have a very natural and
a very wholesome fear of centralization. We are afraid of any centralized
national agency, with its possible bad
effect upon local institutions. But in
a locally respected university these
questions can be taken up in their
national aspects without any fear of
an attempt to efface the locality.
My hope is that we need not wait
for ministers of justice to take this
up but that our law schools will take
the burden of this work upon themselves also, and that they will do for
legislation in the time before us what
they did for the traditional element
of our law in time past. (Applause)

The Reason
Mistress: "So your matrimonial life
was very unhappy. What was the
trouble? December wedded to May?"
"Lan' sake, no,
Chloe Johnson:
mai!
It was Labor Day wedded to
de Day of Rest!"
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Wanted
Copies of the Journals for the
11th Session (1876) of the House
and of the Council of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory
of Colorado. Communicate with
Editors. Telephone Main 1234.

Notice
Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, will
deliver two addresses in Denver on
Monday, December 12, under the auspices of The Foundation for the Advancement of the Social Sciences of
the University of Denver.
The first of these occasions will be
at luncheon at the Cosmopolitan Hotel
at 12:10 P. M., to which all members
of the Bar Association are invited.
$1.00 per plate. Dr. Butler will speak
on "The Path to Peace."
The second occasion will be at the
Municipal Auditorium at 8:30 P. M.,
to which the public generally is invited.
Dr. Butler's subject in the evening
will be "The International Mind."
On account of limited seating facilities, it is necessary to make reservations for each of these occasions,
through the office of the Foundation
at the University of Denver, by letter
or telephone. Seats will be reserved
in the order of application.

New Members
The following applicants have been
approved by the Membership Committee of The Denver Bar Association and
will be voted upon at the meeting to
be held on December 5, 1927:
Hyman D. Landy
Fred Y. Holland
Thompson G. Marsh
James R. Jones
James D. Parriott
Frank Swancara

